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Abstract
In this note, we prove two new impossibility results for random assignment mech-
anisms: Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) showed that no assignment mechanism
can satisfy strategyproofness, ordinal efficiency, and symmetry at the same time,
and Mennle and Seuken (2017) gave a decomposition of strategyproofness into
the axioms swap monotonicity, upper invariance, and lower invariance. For our
first impossibility result, we show that upper invariance, lower invariance, ordinal
efficiency, and symmetry are incompatible. This refines the prior impossibility
result because it relaxes swap monotonicity. For our second impossibility result, we
show that no assignment mechanism satisfies swap monotonicity, lower invariance,
ordinal efficiency, anonymity, neutrality, and non-bossiness. By contrasts, the
Probabilistic Serial (PS ) mechanism that Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) intro-
duced, satisfies these axioms when lower invariance is replaced by upper invariance.
It follows that there cannot exists a lower invariant counterpart to PS.
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1 Model
Let N be a set of n agents and let M be a set of n objects. Each agent i P N has a
strict preference order Pi over objects, where Pi : a ą b means that agent i prefers object
a to object b. The set of all preference orders is denoted by P. A preference profile
P “ pP1, . . . , Pnq P PN is a collection of preference orders of all agents, and we denote
by P´i “ pP1, . . . , Pi´1, Pi`1, . . . , Pnq P PNztiu the collection of preference orders of all
agents, except i.
A (random) assignment is represented by a bi-stochastic matrix x “ pxi,jqiPN,jPM (i.e.,
xi,j P r0, 1s, ři1PN xi1,j “ 1, and řj1PM xi,j1 “ 1 for all i P N, j P M). The entry xi,j is
the probability that agent i gets object j. An assignment is deterministic if all agents
get exactly one full object (i.e., xi,j P t0, 1u for all i P N, j P M). For any agent i,
the ith row xi “ pxi,jqjPM of the matrix x is called the assignment vector of i (or i’s
assignment for short). The Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem and its extensions (Budish
et al., 2013) ensure that, given any random assignment, we can always find a lottery over
deterministic assignments that implements these marginal probabilities. Finally, let X
and ∆pXq denote the spaces of all deterministic and random assignments, respectively.
A (random assignment) mechanism is a mapping ϕ : PN Ñ ∆pXq that chooses an
assignment based on a profile of reported preference orders. ϕipPi, P´iq is the assignment
vector that agent i receives if it reports Pi and the other agents report P´i. A mechanism
is deterministic if it only selects deterministic assignments (i.e., ϕ : PN Ñ X).
2 Properties of Mechanisms
In this section, we present the axioms that are needed for the formulation of our
impossibility results. For this purpose, let ϕ be a mechanism, let P P P be a preference
profile, let i P N be some agent, let x, y P ∆pXq be two assignments, and let xi and yi
be the assignment vector if i in x and y, respectively.
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2.1 Ordinal Efficiency
First, we define first order-stochastic dominance and ordinal efficiency, which is a
refinement of ex-post efficiency.1
Definition 1 (First Order-stochastic Dominance). xi first order-stochastically dominates
yi at Pi if, for all objects j PM ,ÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ąj
xi,j1 ě
ÿ
j1PM : Pi:j1ąj
yi,j1 . (1)
This dominance is strict if inequality (1) is strict for at least one object j PM .
x ordinally dominates y at P if xi first order-stochastically dominates yi at Pi for all
agents i P N , and this dominance is strict if the dominance of xi over yi at Pi is strict
for at least one agent i P N .
Definition 2 (Ordinal Efficiency). x is ordinally efficient at P if there exists no other
assignment y P ∆pXq that strictly ordinally dominates x at P . ϕ is ordinally efficient if
ϕpP q is ordinally efficiency at P for all preference profiles P P PN .
2.2 Incentive Properties
In this section, we define the well known requirement of strategyproofness and three
axioms into which strategyproofness can be decomposed. These axioms and the decom-
position result were originally given in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017).
Definition 3 (Strategyproofness). ϕ is strategyproof if, for all agents i P N , all preference
profiles pPi, P´iq P PN , and all preference orders P 1i P NPi , we have that ϕipPi, P´iq first
order-stochastically dominates ϕipP 1i , P´iq at Pi.
The three axioms we define next restrict the way in which a mechanism can react
to certain changes in an agent’s preference report. Specifically, the axioms specify the
mechanism’s behavior when an agent inverts the order of two consecutively ranked
objects.
1An assignment is ex-post efficient if it can be decomposed into Pareto undominated, deterministic
assignments.
3
Definition 4 (Neighborhood). For any two preference orders P, P 1 P P we say that P
and P 1 are adjacent if they differ by just a swap of two consecutive object; formally,
P : j1 ą . . . ą jk´1 ą jk ą jk`1 ą jk`2 ą . . . ą jm,
P 1 : j1 ą . . . ą jk´1 ą jk`1 ą jk ą jk`2 ą . . . ą jm.
The set of all preference orders adjacent to P is the neighborhood of P , denoted NP .
Definition 5 (Upper and Lower Contour Sets). For an object j PM and a preference
order P P P, the upper contour set Upj, P q and the lower contour set Lpj, P q of j at
P are the sets of objects that an agent with preference order P strictly prefers to j or
likes strictly less than j, respectively; formally, Upj, P q “ tj1 P M | P : j1 ą ju and
Lpj, P q “ tj1 PM | P : j ą j1u.
Definition 6 (Swap Monotonicity). ϕ is swap monotonic if, for all agents i P N ,
all preference profiles pPi, P´iq P PN , and all preference orders P 1i P NPi from the
neighborhood of Pi with Pi : j ą j1 but P 1i : j1 ą j, one of the following holds:
• either ϕipPi, P´iq “ ϕipP 1i , P´iq,
• or ϕi,jpPi, P´iq ą ϕi,jpP 1i , P´iq and ϕi,j1pPi, P´iq ă ϕi,j1pP 1i , P´iq.
Definition 7 (Upper Invariance). ϕ is upper invariant if for all agents i P N , all prefer-
ence profiles pPi, P´iq P PN , and all preference orders P 1i P NPi from the neighborhood
of Pi with Pi : j ą j1 but P 1i : j1 ą j, we have that i’s assignment for objects from the
upper contour set of j does not change; formally
ϕi,j2pPi, P´iq “ ϕi,j2pP 1i , P´iq for all j2 P Upj, Piq. (2)
Definition 8 (Lower Invariance). ϕ is lower invariant if, for all agents i P N , all prefer-
ence profiles pPi, P´iq P PN , and all preference orders P 1i P NPi from the neighborhood
of Pi with Pi : j ą j1 but P 1i : j1 ą j, we have that i’s assignment for objects from the
lower contour set of j1 does not change; formally
ϕi,j2pPi, P´iq “ ϕi,j2pP 1i , P´iq for all j2 P Lpj1, Piq. (3)
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2.3 Fairness Properties
In this section, we define several common fairness properties.
Definition 9 (Symmetry). x is symmetric at P if xi “ xi1 for all i, i1 P N with Pi “ Pi1 .
ϕ is symmetric if ϕpP q is symmetric at P for any preference profile P P PN .
Symmetry is also sometimes referred to as equal treatment of equals.
Definition 10 (Anonymity). ϕ is anonymous if, for all pairs pP ,P 1q P PN ˆ PN of
preference profile with
• Pi “ P 1i1 and Pi1 “ P 1i for two agents i, i1 P N ,
• Pi2 “ P 1i2 for all other agents i2 P Nzti, i1u,
we have that ϕipP q “ ϕi1pP 1q.
Observe that anonymity implies symmetry but the converse does not hold.
2.4 Other Properties
We now define two additional properties: neutrality and non-bossiness. For a preference
order P P P and two objects j, j1 PM , let P jØj1 be the preference order such that
P : j1 ą . . . ą jk´1 ą j ą jk`1 ą . . . ą jk1´1 ą j1 ą jk1`1 ą . . . ą jm,
P jØj
1
: j1 ą . . . ą jk´1 ą j1 ą jk`1 ą . . . ą jk1´1 ą j ą jk1`1 ą . . . ą jm.
In words, P and P jØj1 coincide except that the objects j and j1 have traded positions.
For a preference profile P P PN and two objects j, j1 PM let P jØj1 be the preference
profile with the preference orders P jØj
1
i constructed in this way.
Definition 11 (Neutrality). ϕ is neutral if, for all preference profiles P P PN and all
pairs of objects objects pj, j1q PM2, we have that ϕi,jpP q “ ϕi,j1pP jØj1q for all i P N .
In words, under a neutral mechanism, the assignment is independent of the specific
names of the objects.
Definition 12 (Non-bossiness). ϕ is non-bossy if, for all agents i P N , all preference
profiles pPi, P´iq P PN , and all preference orders P 1i P NPi such that ϕipPi, P´iq “
ϕipP 1i , P´iq, we have that ϕpPi, P´iq “ ϕpP 1i , P´iq.
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3 Prior Results
In this section, we restate two prior results: our own decomposition of strategyproofness
from (Mennle and Seuken, 2017) and the impossibility result from (Bogomolnaia and
Moulin, 2001) pertaining to the incompatibility of strategyproofness, ordinal efficiency,
and symmetry.
Theorem (Theorem 1 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017)). A mechanism is strategyproof if
and only if it is swap monotonic, upper invariant, and lower invariant.
Theorem (Theorem 2 in (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001)). For n ě 4, there exists no
mechanism that satisfies strategyproofness, ordinal efficiency, and symmetry.
4 Two New Impossibility Results
In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), we have shown that an interesting relaxed notion of
strategyproofness arises when lower invariance is dropped from strategyproofness. The
Probabilistic Serial mechanism (PS) (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) satisfies this relaxed
incentive requirement. Specifically, it is swap monotonic, upper invariant, ordinally
efficient, and symmetric. This raises the question whether other interesting relaxed
notions of strategyproofness can be obtained by dropping either swap monotonicity or
upper invariance instead.
The following two impossibility results show that such relaxations do not admit the
construction of new and appealing mechanisms.
4.1 An Impossibility Result without Swap Monotonicity
Theorem 1. For n ě 4, there exists no mechanism that satisfies upper invariance, lower
invariance, ordinal efficiency, and symmetry.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that ϕ is an upper invariant, lower invariant,
ordinally efficient, symmetric mechanism. Consider a setting with four agents N “
t1, 2, 3, 4u and four objects M “ ta, b, c, du. To derive a contradiction, we derive the
assignments that ϕ must produce at various preference profiles. Figure 1 shows the order
in which we consider these preference profiles. Arrows indicate that we use information
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Figure 1: Order of derivation of assignments
about the assignment at one preference profile to infer information about the assignment
at another and the lightning indicates the contradiction.
I: By symmetry, we have
ϕpP pIqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pIq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pIq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIq
3 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIq
4 : a ą b ą c ą d
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{4 1{4 1{4 1{41{4 1{4 1{4 1{4
1{4 1{4 1{4 1{4
1{4 1{4 1{4 1{4
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (4)
I Ñ II: If agent 4 swaps c and d, we get
ϕpP pIIqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pIIq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pIIq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIIq
3 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIIq
4 : a ą b ą d ą c
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{4 1{4 1{3 1{61{4 1{4 1{3 1{6
1{4 1{4 1{3 1{6
1{4 1{4 0 1{2
‹˛‹‹‹‚, (5)
which follows from the following observations:
1. 4’s assignment for a and b cannot change by upper invariance.
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2. By symmetry, the remaining probabilities for a and b must be evenly dis-
tributed across agents 1, 2, and 3.
3. If agent 4 had a strictly positive probability for c, agents 1, 2, and 3 would
have zero probability for d, or else they could trade with 4 and improve their
assignments in a first order-stochastic dominance sense. However, this is not
possible by ordinal efficiency. Thus, ϕ4,cpP pIIqq “ 0.
4. Since agent 4 has zero probability for c, it must receive d with probability 1{2
by feasibility. The remaining probabilities for c and d must again be evenly
distributed across agents 1, 2, and 3.
II Ñ III: Next, suppose that agent 4 swaps b and d. Then
ϕpP pIIIqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pIIIq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pIIIq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIIIq
3 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIIIq
4 : a ą d ą b ą c
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{4 1{3 1{3 1{121{4 1{3 1{3 1{12
1{4 1{3 1{3 1{12
1{4 0 0 3{4
‹˛‹‹‹‚ (6)
because
1. 4’s assignment for a and c cannot change by upper and lower invariance.
2. If agent 4 had a strictly positive probability for b, agents 1, 2, and 3 would
have positive probability for d, which contradicts ordinal efficiency.
3. This determines the assignment vector of agent 4. By symmetry, the remaining
probabilities have to be evenly distributed across agents 1, 2, and 3.
II Ñ IV : Going back to preference profile P pIIq, suppose that agent 3 swaps c and d.
Then
ϕpP pIV qq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pIV q1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pIV q2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIV q
3 : a ą b ą d ą c
P
pIV q
4 : a ą b ą d ą c
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{4 1{4 1{2 01{4 1{4 1{2 0
1{4 1{4 0 1{2
1{4 1{4 0 1{2
‹˛‹‹‹‚ (7)
because
1. 3’s assignment for a and b cannot change by upper invariance.
8
2. By symmetry, 4’s assignment for a and b has to be 1{4 each.
3. Completing the assignment matrix, 1’s and 2’s assignment for a and b must
also be 1{4 each.
4. If 3 and 4 receive c with positive probability, then 1 and 2 would receive d
with positive probability, which contradicts ordinal efficiency.
III&IV Ñ V : Now consider P pV q, which arises from P pIIIq when agent 3 swaps c and
d. Upper invariance implies that ϕ3,apP pV qq “ 1{4 and ϕ3,bpP pV qq “ 1{3. On the
other hand, P pV q also arises if agent 4 swaps b and d in P pIV q, and upper and lower
invariance imply that ϕ4,apP pV qq “ 1{4 and ϕ4,cpP pV qq “ 0. Thus,
ϕpP pV qq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pV q1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pV q2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pV q
3 : a ą b ą d ą c
P
pV q
4 : a ą d ą b ą c
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{4 1{3 5{12 01{4 1{3 5{12 0
1{4 1{3 1{6 1{4
1{4 0 0 3{4
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (8)
To see the how the remaining entries are fixed, observe the following:
1. Agent 4 cannot have positive probability for b. Otherwise, some other agents
would have positive probability for d, which contradicts ordinal efficiency.
This fixes ϕ4,dpP pV qq “ 3{4.
2. By symmetry, all agents must receive a with probability 1{4 and agents 1 and
2 must receive b with probability 1{3 each.
3. Agents 1 and 2 must have probability 0 for d. Otherwise, ordinal effi-
ciency would imply ϕ3,cpP pV qq “ 0 and thus ϕ3,dpP pV qq “ 5{12. However,
ϕ3,dpP pV qq ` ϕ4,dpP pV qq “ 3{4` 5{12 ą 1, a contradiction to feasibility.
4. The remaining entries follow from bi-stochasticity.
I Ñ V I: Going back to P pIq, suppose that agent 3 swaps a and b. The resulting
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assignment is
ϕpP pV Iqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pV Iq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pV Iq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pV Iq
3 : b ą a ą c ą d
P
pV Iq
4 : a ą b ą c ą d
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{3 1{6 1{4 1{41{3 1{6 1{4 1{4
0 1{2 1{4 1{4
1{3 1{6 1{4 1{4
‹˛‹‹‹‚, (9)
where the arguments are analogous to those for I Ñ II.
III&V I Ñ V II: Going back to P pIIIq, suppose that agent 3 swaps a and b, then we get
ϕpP pV IIqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pV IIq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pV IIq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pV IIq
3 : b ą a ą c ą d
P
pV IIq
4 : a ą d ą b ą c
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{3 5{24 1{3 1{81{3 5{24 1{3 1{8
0 7{12 1{3 1{12
1{3 0 0 2{3
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (10)
To see why, observe the following:
1. By lower invariance, 3’s assignment for c and d cannot change relative to
ϕ3pP pIIIqq.
2. Agent 3 may not get a with positive probability; otherwise, some other agent
receives b with positive probability, which contradicts ordinal efficiency. This
completely fixes the assignment of agent 3.
3. By ordinal efficiency and the fact that ϕ3,dpP pV IIqq ą 0, agent 4 may not get
b or c with positive probability.
4. If agent 4 swaps d with b and then with c, upper invariance requires that
agent 4’s assignment for a does not change. Since these changes induce
preference profile P pV Iq, we obtain ϕ4,apP pV IIqq “ 1{3. This completely fixed
the assignment of agent 4.
5. The assignments of 1 and 2 follow by symmetry.
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V I&V II Ñ V III: Starting with P pV IIq, if agent 3 swaps c and d, we get
ϕpP pV IIIqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pV IIIq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pV IIIq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pV IIIq
3 : b ą a ą d ą c
P
pV IIIq
4 : a ą d ą b ą c
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{3 5{24 11{24 01{3 5{24 11{24 0
0 7{12 x 5{12´ x
1{3 0 1{12´ x 7{12` x
‹˛‹‹‹‚
(11)
for some x P r0, 1{12s. To see why, observe the following:
1. By upper invariance, agent 3 retains the same probabilities for a and b as
under P pV IIq.
2. Starting at P pV Iq, if agent 3 swaps c and d, its assignment for a cannot
change by upper invariance, and by symmetry, agent 4 would still receive
a with probability 1{3. Again by upper invariance, agent 4 may then swap
d with c and b, which cannot change agent 4’s probability for a. Thus,
ϕ4,apP pV IIIqq “ 1{3.
3. If agent 4 had a positive probability for b, then some other agent would
have positive probability for d, a contradiction to ordinal efficiency. Thus,
ϕ4,bpP pV IIIqq “ 0.
4. The remaining probabilities for a and b follow by symmetry.
5. If agents 1 and 2 had positive probability for d, then neither 3 nor 4 could have
positive probability for c by ordinal efficiency. Thus, agents 1 and 2 would
have to absorb all probability for c symmetrically. However, each of them
already receives either a or b with a total probability of 13{24, which is greater
than 1{2, a contradiction. Therefore, ϕ1,dpP pV IIIqq “ ϕ2,dpP pV IIIqq “ 0.
6. The assignment for c of agents 1 and 2 is determined by their assignments for
all other objects.
7. The remaining share of c of 1{12 must be absorbed by agents 3 and 4.
Specifically, let ϕ3,cpP pV IIIqq “ x, where x P r0, 1{12s.
Finally, observe that if agent 3 swaps a and b in P pV IIIq, we arrive at P pV q. We get
ϕ3,cpP pV qq “ x P r0, 1{12s from upper invariance. However we previously observed that
ϕ3,cpP pV qq “ 1{6, a contradiction.
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If there is a fifth agent (5, say) and a fifth object (e, say), we append e at the ends
of the preference orders of the agents 1, 2, 3, 4 and let agent 5 prefer object e to all
other objects. By ordinal efficiency, agent 5 must receive object e with certainty at all
preference profiles, but the remaining relationships are unchanged. For any additional
agents and objects, we proceed likewise. The contradiction can then be derived as in the
case of four agents.
Theorem 1 shows that no mechanism can be upper invariant, lower invariant, ordinally
efficient, and symmetric. This refines the impossibility result of Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001), who showed that no mechanism can be strategyproof, ordinally efficient, and
symmetric. Both upper and lower invariance are implied by strategyproofness but the
opposite does not hold (Mennle and Seuken, 2017). For n ď 3, ex-post efficiency coincides
with ordinal efficiency. Since the Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism is strategyproof,
ex-post efficient, and symmetric, it satisfies all requirements for n ď 3.
4.2 An Impossibility Result without Upper Invariance
In this section, we prove our second impossibility result. Recall that among swap
monotonic and upper invariant mechanisms, PS is appealing as it satisfies ordinal
efficiency, anonymity, neutrality, and non-bossiness. Our new result shows that it is
impossible to design mechanisms like PS which are swap monotonic and lower invariant
and have the same good axiomtic properties otherwise.
Theorem 2. For n ě 4, there exists no mechanism that satisfies swap monotonicity,
lower invariance, ordinal efficiency, anonymity, neutrality, and non-bossiness.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that ϕ is a swap monotonic, lower invariant, ordi-
nally efficient, anonymous, neutral, and non-bossy mechanism. Consider a setting with
four agents N “ t1, 2, 3, 4u and four objects M “ ta, b, c, du. To derive a contradiction,
we derive the assignments that ϕ must produce at various preference profiles. Figure
2 shows the order in which we consider these preference profiles. Arrows indicate that
we use information about the assignment at one preference profile to infer information
about the assignment at another and the lightning indicates the contradiction.
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Figure 2: Order of derivation of assignments
I: First, we show that
ϕpP pIqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pIq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pIq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIq
3 : b ą a ą d ą c
P
pIq
4 : b ą a ą d ą c
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{2 0 1{2 01{2 0 1{2 0
0 1{2 0 1{2
0 1{2 0 1{2
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (12)
Since anonymity implies symmetry, we find that the assignment must have the
form
ϕpP pIqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pIq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pIq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIq
3 : b ą a ą d ą c
P
pIq
4 : b ą a ą d ą c
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ x1,a x1,b x1,c x1,dx1,a x1,b x1,c x1,d
x3,a x3,b x3,c x3,d
x3,a x3,b x3,c x3,d
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (13)
By anonymity, agents 1 and 2 may exchange their preference orders with agent 3
and 4. The new assignment must have the form
ϕpP pI 1qq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pI
1q
1 : b ą a ą d ą c
P
pI 1q
2 : b ą a ą d ą c
P
pI 1q
3 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pI 1q
4 : a ą b ą c ą d
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ x3,a x3,b x3,c x3,dx3,a x3,b x3,c x3,d
x1,a x1,b x1,c x1,d
x1,a x1,b x1,c x1,d
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (14)
By neutrality, we can rename objects as follows: aù b, bù a, cù d, and
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dù c. The new assignment must have the form
ϕpP pI2qq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pI
2q
1 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pI2q
2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pI2q
3 : b ą a ą d ą c
P
pI2q
4 : b ą a ą d ą c
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ x3,b x3,a x3,d x3,cx3,b x3,a x3,d x3,c
x1,b x1,a x1,d x1,c
x1,b x1,a x1,d x1,c
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (15)
But since P pIq “ P pI2q we must have x1,a “ x3,b, x1,b “ x3,a, x1,c “ x3,d, and
x1,d “ x3,c. If x3,c ą 0, then x1,d ą 0, which violates ordinal efficiency. Therefore,
x1,b “ x1,d “ x3,a “ x3,c “ 0. The remaining entries follow from symmetric
distribution of the probabilities to the respective agents.
I Ñ II: Starting with P pIq let agent 3 swap a down in until it has reached the last
position. Since agent 3’s probability for receiving a is already 0, none of these
swaps can further reduce this probability. By swap monotonicity, none of the
swaps can therefore change the agent 3’s assignment at all. By non-bossiness, the
assignment remains unchanged for all agents. Similarly, agent 4 may rank a last
without changing the assignment. We obtain
ϕpP pIIqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pIIq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pIIq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIIq
3 : b ą d ą c ą a
P
pIIq
4 : b ą d ą c ą a
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{2 0 1{2 01{2 0 1{2 0
0 1{2 0 1{2
0 1{2 0 1{2
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (16)
III: The arguments to show that
ϕpP pIIIqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pIIIq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pIIIq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIIIq
3 : d ą b ą c ą a
P
pIIIq
4 : d ą b ą c ą a
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{2 1{4 1{4 01{2 1{4 1{4 0
0 1{4 1{4 1{2
0 1{4 1{4 1{2
‹˛‹‹‹‚ (17)
are the same as those used to derive the assignment for P pIq.
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II&III Ñ IV : Next, we show that
ϕpP pIV qq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pIV q1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pIV q2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pIV q
3 : b ą d ą c ą a
P
pIV q
4 : d ą b ą c ą a
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{2 1{8 3{8 01{2 1{8 3{8 0
0 3{4 1{4 0
0 0 0 1
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (18)
This follows from the following observations:
1. P pIV q arises from P pIIIq when agent 3 swaps d and b. By lower invariance,
agent 3’s assignment for a and c may not change, so that ϕ3,apP pIV qq “ 0 and
ϕ3,cpP pIV qq “ 1{4.
2. Similarly, P pIV q arises from P pIIq when agent 4 swaps b and d, and by lower
invariance we get ϕ4,apP pIV qq “ 0 and ϕ4,cpP pIV qq “ 0.
3. Agents 1 and 2 have no probability for receiving d. Otherwise, agent 3 would
trade its probability for c, a contradiction to ordinal efficiency.
4. If agent 4 had positive probability for b, ordinal efficiency would imply that
agent 3 has no probability for d. But then 4 would receive d with probability
1, which contradicts the assumption that agent 4 has positive probability for
b. Thus, ϕ4,bpP pIV qq “ 0, which implies ϕ4,dpP pIV qq “ 1.
5. Bi-stochasticity and symmetry imply the remaining probabilities.
IV Ñ V : Starting with P pIV q, let agent 3 rank d in the last position. Similar to the case
I Ñ II, this does not change the assignment for anyone (by swap monotonicity
and non-bossiness), so we get
ϕpP pV qq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pV q1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pV q2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pV q
3 : b ą c ą a ą d
P
pV q
4 : d ą b ą c ą a
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{2 1{8 3{8 01{2 1{8 3{8 0
0 3{4 1{4 0
0 0 0 1
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (19)
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V Ñ V I: Starting with P pV q, let agent 3 swap c and a. We show that
ϕpP pV Iqq “ ϕ
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pV Iq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pV Iq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pV Iq
3 : b ą a ą c ą d
P
pV Iq
4 : d ą b ą c ą a
‹˛‹‹‹‚“
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ 1{2 1{8 3{8 01{2 1{8 3{8 0
0 3{4 1{4 0
0 0 0 1
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (20)
This follows from the following observations:
1. By lower invariance, agent 3 gets d with probability 0.
2. If agents 1 and 2 received d with any positive probability, they could trade
with agent 4, a contradiction to ordinal efficiency. Thus, ϕ1,dpP pV Iqq “
ϕ2,dpP pV Iqq “ 0, ϕ4,apP pV Iqq “ ϕ4,bpP pV Iqq “ ϕ4,cpP pV Iqq “ 0, and ϕ4,dpP pV Iqq “
1.
3. If agent 3 received a with positive probability, it could trade with agents
1 and 2 for probability for b, which contradicts ordinal efficiency. Thus,
ϕ3,apP pV Iqq “ 0.
4. Observe that the swap of a and c by agent 3 had no effect on 3’s probability
for obtaining a. By swap monotonicity, 3’s assignment can not change at all,
which yields ϕ3,bpP pV Iqq “ 3{4 and ϕ3,cpP pV Iqq “ 1{4.
5. The remaining probabilities are distributed symmetrically to agents 1 and 2.
V I Ñ V II: Starting with P pV Iq, let agent agent 3 swap b and a, such that
P pV IIq “
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ P pV IIq1 : a ą b ą c ą dP pV IIq2 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pV IIq
3 : a ą b ą c ą d
P
pV IIq
4 : d ą b ą c ą a
‹˛‹‹‹‚. (21)
By lower invariance, ϕ3,cpP pV IIqq “ 1{4 and ϕ3,dpP pV IIqq “ 0. Symmetry implies
ϕ1,cpP pV IIqq “ ϕ2,cpP pV IIqq “ 1{4 and ϕ1,dpP pV IIqq “ ϕ2,dpP pV IIqq “ 0 as well.
Thus ϕ4,dpP pV IIqq “ 1 and ϕ4,cpP pV IIqq “ 1{4, which is infeasible , a contradiction.
The extension to more than 4 agents and objects is analogous to the same extension in
Theorem 1.
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